East African Railways and Harbours 1945-60: from ‘crisis of accumulation’ to labour resistance by Hyde, D. & Hyde, D.
East African Railways and Harbours 1945-60: 
                   from ‘crisis of accumulation’ to labour resistance1 
                                                                             
                                                                                    David Hyde  
  
Abstract  
Weak infrastructure, a low level of development and ‘underdevelopment’ generally can and does inhibit the metamorphosis 
of the commodity form within peripheral sites of production. Anti-commodity tendencies can also be manifest as ‘the 
commons’ refusing commodification, or as goods and resources destined for commodification but which resist the full 
evolution into the commodity form. This is deeply symptomatic of crisis and breakdown. 
What follows is an examination of a pivotal local crisis which erupted within the spine of East Africa’s transport system during 
late colonialism, that has received little acknowledgement. The essence of the severe financial crisis which beset East African 
Railways and Harbours [E.A.R.H.] lay in its prescribed role as the provider of cheap transportation to underwrite the 
profitability of Kenya's settler economy, a function which it had long struggled to sustain. The function of E.A.R.H. as a state 
monopoly was to facilitate commodification, fulfilling the transition from goods to commodities. How could E.A.R.H., after 
years of overwork and neglect, renew its infrastructure to continue in this  role of enabling local production?  The work draws 
upon Marx’s work in Capital in an attempt to address these questions.  
The recurrent crises which beset capital dominate the wage bargaining process where the terms and conditions of 
commodification are periodically contested. The work brings into view labour power as the anti-commodity par excellence, a 
living substance whose bearers simultaneously embrace and defy commodification.  
 
 
Background and Introduction 
      The post-war primary commodities boom and its accompanying production drive to generate dollars to fund  
Britain’s post war reconstruction and repay debts to the United States, combined with the financial and 
infrastructural demands of the Mau Mau Emergency2 to place E.A.R.H. under great strain.  As the boom petered 
out after 1954, E.A.R.H. was caught in a vice, between intense pressure to hold fast its already low freight charges 
to subsidise Kenya’s troubled plantation economy3, and its own requirements to address severe capital 
depreciation brought on by the post war export drive and the demands of the colonial war against Mau Mau.  
Whilst a programme of major reinvestment was required, the company’s Renewals Fund4 was virtually depleted 
forcing the colonial government towards the restructuring of the state monopoly. In a desperate bid to initiate 
this process, E.A.R.H. was faced with relinquishing its perennially low tariffs, though this threatened to reduce the 
competitiveness of the colony’s agricultural exports still further. The company’s preferred route was to go to war 
with its African workforce in an attempt to pass on the costs of resolving these problems through a programme of 
rationalisation which was to involve wage cuts and large scale redundancies throughout the region.  
     The ensuing crisis provoked fierce resistance from African railwaymen in all three colonies. The majority of 
Kenya's rail men stopped work in response to the Railway African Union's call for a colony wide strike which 
began on November 14th, 1959. Rail men in Tanganyika and Uganda followed them into action to mark the 
region's only inter-territorial strike which continued intermittently until August 19605. This had an immense 
impact and triggered the era of strike waves which accompanied the transition to independence. While treated by 
union leaders as a wages struggle, the rail strike was a deeply political conflict which questioned the terms and 
conditions of the transition to the post colony. The deep and protracted financial crisis within E.A.R.H., the 
region’s largest employer, is examined here to appreciate the source of this conflict. Why did  the region’s most 
privileged African workers, hitherto the most conservative and quietist, move into confrontation with their state 
employer?  
 
A Restoration Crisis Emerges 
     E.A.R.H. was created in 1949 as a supra-national public utility when its predecessors, the Kenya and Uganda 
Railways and Harbours, and the Tanganyika Railways and Ports Services, were amalgamated under the auspices of 
the East African High Commission. By this time, the railway network was well over fifty years old. Railway 
construction had begun  at Mombasa in 1896 and by the turn of the century stretched far into the interior, 
reaching Kisumu by 1901. The original plan to take the line onto Kampala was not completed until 1931. By 1946 
settler demand for transport services to serve plantation and farm production had led to the construction of 
branch lines to Kitale, Thomson’s Falls, and Rongai. These were sited to ensure that European farms and 
plantations were mostly located not more than 25 miles  away from the main line2. Historically, the railway’s role 
as the principal artery of the colonial economy,  was to shift vast quantities of primary products, including cotton, 
sisal, copper, coffee and tea from upcountry to the coast. By the 1950s it’s continuing ability to fulfil this function 
was being undermined by serious capital depreciation and  road haulage competition. 
     Reinvestment had been neglected for years as E.A.R.H. had kept its margins narrow to subsidise the 
profitability of settler agriculture. The state monopoly served as a handmaiden of private capital, a point spelt out 
in Section 21 of the East African Railways and Harbours Administration Act [1950], that the ‘Administration shall 
be administered on business principles and, so far as is not inconsistent  therewith of the principles of prudent 
finance, cheap transport will be provided by the Administration to assist agricultural, mining and industrial 
development in the Territories’6. The company invariably broke even on paper, with its published accounts figures 
showing  regular, though modest, surpluses. Ritual savings were set aside to the ‘Renewals Fund’, though by the 
turn of the fifties an approaching restoration crisis placed unbearable demands on this reserve. Another 
contributory factor to the unsustainable burden on the railway system was the Government's post-war 
industrialisation strategy to attract international firms into the colony with the lure of low wages  and  cheap 
transport. These companies came in  search of a field of investment where the organic composition of capital7 
was lower, thus offering the potential for  higher rates of profit  than could be yielded  in their home bases, 
though this was at the expense of a creeping restoration crisis within E.A.R.H.’s  capital formation. 
     Whilst the railway had shouldered the expansion of the colonial economy, it had been short-changed through 
continuous net deductions from its side of the account. Though it had functioned to promote and subsidise the 
capital accumulation8 of the settlers and overseas investors,  little attention was paid to the problems of 
E.A.R.H.’s expanded reproduction. The war period in particular had taken its toll. While settler capital enjoyed 
unprecedented prosperity producing for the war effort, the railways were run into the ground. By the end of the 
fifties, with the additional  strains imposed on the system by the demands of  overseas investors  impatient for a 
return, the  years of neglect were catching up with the company. Much of its rolling stock had depreciated 
beyond the costs of servicing. After wages, by far the company’s largest expenditures were on loan repayments, 
fuel and stores, which reflected the rising costs of maintaining an antiquated rail network. In allowing repeated 
deductions from its own capital, E.A.R.H. showed a declining rate of profit which claimed its surpluses and 
rendered the company unable to sustain its accrued indebtedness.  
     As the semblances of this crisis penetrated the thinking of the Administration, a partial though belated grasp of 
its contradictions became evident as the company acknowledged that railways, ‘like everything else, wear out in 
time. Although this does not amount to very much each year, after about fifty years the track will be completely 
worn out and will need replacing. Hence the Renewals Fund, a sum of finance capital will be put aside each year 
approximate to the costs of wear and tear and the projected costs of replacement  at the end of a fifty year 
period’9.  As the climax of this period  approached, the reserves to finance capital  renewal on the scale required 
were found wanting in face of the accelerated rate of depreciation brought on by the post war production drive. 
This crisis had spontaneously ripened. Nothing had been forseen, few people had wanted to forsee. Severely 
lacking in foresight, the management of E.A.R.H. had plodded on for years  empirically adapting themselves to the 
accomplished fact of a colonial economy being run into the ground, sacrificed at the altar of Britain’s post-war 
reconstruction.  
     Much of E.A.R.H.’s rolling stock and fixed capital were obsolete. Profit could not crystallise from this constant 
capital, since this had depreciated and lost its value as this transferred to the commodities that were distributed.  
In essence the railways had been repeatedly raped and over a long period. Furthermore, the devaluation of the 
productive forces, of men and things, was severely aggravated by the diminishing technical superiority of E.A.R.H. 
in face of competition from other forms of transport. This put intense strain on the railway to pull greater 
tonnages and meet tight delivery deadlines. Running costs escalated as the trains got longer and heavier. As the 
company’s running costs spiralled, the exploitation of its working capital was stepped up to pull itself back from 
the abyss. As the wear and tear on constant capital became more intense, a restoration crisis approached. This 
was evidenced by more breakdowns, more repairs and higher overheads to maintain ageing capital equipment, 
under circumstances where the rate of accumulation was too low to secure sufficient replacement capital. The 
only variable that could, at least potentially, be controlled was the cost of labour power. This seemed to make the 
prospect of taking on the railmen unpostponable.  
     According to its 1958 annual report, E.A.R.H. management had put all its efforts into ‘operational economies’, 
following the disastrous performance of the previous year. This involved the rationalisation and much more 
intense exploitation of existing capital that was already well on its way out. The result, according to the East 
African Standard, was that ‘the operating efficiency of the railways, expressed in terms of working expenditure to 
revenue, improved by 6% - “a remarkable achievement” ’10. But could the train take the strain?  While E.A.R.H. 
revenue increased by nearly a million pounds during the year, this was achieved through ‘heavier goods traffic 
while reducing the working expenditure’ [£70,000 less than the previous year] and higher freight charges 
introduced on October 1st, 1957. Other factors contributed to this ‘turnaround’, principally redundancies, lower 
maintenance costs and ‘lower engine mileage’11. This suggested a number of things.  
     There was no doubt that  much of the company’s rolling stock and fixed capital was now well into old age. This 
was in need of constant nursing and attention, hence the standard expenditure for fuel and stores in a typical 
year during this period was never less than 20 % of the company’s total budget12.  Though on its own admission 
the company  had made arrangements to ‘stable’ 39 locomotives13, lower engine mileage’s suggested that fewer 
locomotives were already operational and that considerable maintenance efforts were devoted to keeping them 
in service.  These engines were doing all the work while the rest of the fleet were ‘laid off’. Hence their engine 
mileage was  actually  higher, but spread across the company’s total rolling stock it was passed off as lower. 
Another consideration was spare parts and the extent of some engines being broken up to keep others in service, 
though the company was reluctant to part with information on this score. The workforce had also shrunk by 5,720 
to 49,838 railmen during the course of 195814.  Buried amidst the display of the company’s annual published 
figures was evidence that the rate of profit was in irrevocable decline. For, while the net earnings  for the railways 
and harbours  combined totalled  £3,806,000  and were 50% up on 1957, they gave a return of only 3.8% on total 
capital expenditure15. There was a candid admission, and a warning, from the General Manager, J.R. Farquharson, 
that ‘the acute net revenue position coupled with general financial stringency has had a retarding effect on the 
development programme of the administration’16.  
     British investors were well aware of what was required in Kenya. Similar problems were being faced by the 
railway system in Britain. Huge job losses and the closure of many branch lines, together with increases in freight 
charges and fares were all on the way as the ground was prepared for the Beeching rationalisation programme of 
the early 1960s. Marx’s analysis of capitalism’s inherent crises of accumulation enables an appreciation of 
E.A.R.H.’s dilemmas as it faced ‘the need to improve production and expand its scale merely as a means of self 
preservation and under penalty of ruin’17. 
 
Problems  of  Capital Renewal and Augmentation 
     This course was compelling but fraught with problems in a country unable to produce its own capital goods.18  
The weaknesses of the railway network were compounded by the absence of a heavy industrial base, with  
railway engineering industries capable of making components and the engines themselves. The costs of importing 
and installing these, and retraining workers to operate them dwarfed the available resources. Furthermore,  their 
purchase would act as a drag on the rate of profit for years to come in order to pay off the requisite loans. In any 
case, the delays were measured in years for orders of rolling stock and equipment from the U.K. facing its own 
restoration and recovery after the war. The Colonial Office insisted that all Kenya’s capital purchases should be 
made from the U.K.  so it had to wait on British industries to get on their feet sufficiently for these orders to be 
met. These were hardly the best or cheapest locomotives available and had a reputation for high servicing costs, 
whereas Italian and French models were reputedly of higher quality, were cheaper and could be serviced at low 
cost. Here was a further instance of Britain attempting to dump the crises afflicting its decrepit  industries own 
perennially uncompetitive and onto its colonies. These problems severely weakened E.A.R.H.’s continuing ability 
to fulfil its function of shouldering the Kenyan economy. As it faced this crisis one thing was unavoidable, freight 
charges would have to go up and the railmen’s wages would have to be driven down to secure deductions for the 
Renewals Fund. 
     This was an uncertain terrain for the management and posed a clear break with tradition. Both petty 
commodity producers and the plantation companies growing cotton, coffee and other export crops were 
competing in international markets  with countries such as America, Egypt and Brazil.19 Rising freight charges 
stood to take the edge off  East African exports.  E.A.R.H. made great play of this danger, for instance by harping 
on about the effects of industrial action on struggling farmers, ‘It would obviously be most unfair to raise railway 
and port charges for these export commodities merely to pay Railway staff  higher wages if this can be done only 
by reducing the incomes of people working in the industries that provide  traffic’20. Of course this was a spurious 
argument, given the much greater threat from road hauliers which was underplayed. 
     The company announced in July, 1958 that it was to buy diesel electric locomotives worth £2 million and that 
proposals for new lines and ‘other developments’ worth £8 million21  had been approved. Of the proposed 
locomotive purchases, eight were ordered from the English Electric Company in Bradford in a contract worth 
£800,00022. There were problems with this decision, since other more advanced countries were embarking upon 
electrification of their rail networks. This could reduce the competitive life cycle of those diesels on order. As 
much was admitted by E.A.R.H.’s Chief Operating Superintendent, G.P.G. Mackay who indicated that ‘in four or 
five years time  a major decision would have to be taken whether to continue with diesel electric traction or to 
turn to straight electric power’23.  Given the large scale of the region’s rail network, a half baked proposal to  
electrify the fifty miles of railway line between Kampala and Jinja was investigated by Associated Electrical 
Industries24. This would hardly dent the problems of electrification, and its success depended upon increased 
electricity generation from the Uganda Electricity Board’s own power station at Owen Falls near Jinja. Here again 
the management was forced to take a short term decision, since it could hardly contemplate extensive 
electrification given the small size of the company’s Renewals Fund.  
     E.A.R.H. faced a restoration crisis of huge proportions with minimal savings barely adequate to finance even 
short term capital improvements on the scale required.  Another consideration here was the value of the Kenya 
shilling which had fallen following a run on the pound in London. International confidence in sterling was weak 
throughout this period [1959-64] with Britain’s worst trade deficits on record25. The close ties between the Kenya 
shilling and the pound made loans and capital purchases abroad prohibitive. During 1958, the company’s 
shrinking expenditure on ‘new equipment, works and renewals’ was £5 million, £2 million26 less than the previous 
year. Particularly hard hit were ‘constructions’, with only £2,048,000 invested, a drop of £1,673,00027 as 
compared to 1957. Yet again these figures seem to indicate the overriding claims of finance capital on the 
company’s surpluses, crippling  any sustained programme of capital renewal.     
 
Loans and Indebtedness 
     During the first five months of 1958 the company  suffered a shortfall of £185,000 in its projected earnings28, 
which further sharply deteriorated during June when earnings fell £230,000 below target29.  The general 
manager, J.R.Farquharson, attempted to assuage  investors  ‘that although present traffic trends were “rather 
dismal”, there was no reason to doubt that within a few years  traffic would once more expand’30. This was far 
from a forgone conclusion. The workforce would have to be primed and restructured, a task  that would involve  
imposing  draconian conditions  on an increasingly restive group of workers. 
     Also unavoidable was the further drift into the debt spiral, as surpluses melted away into servicing loans and 
the costs of maintaining existing capital increased. As E.A.R.H. continued to keep its prices down, it risked the 
depletion of its productive forces, since the rate of capital accumulation would be insufficient to keep pace with 
depreciation. Any recourse to the money markets to postpone the resolution of these problems would lead to 
inflationary investments, accruing even more debt with crippling interest payments acting as a drag on 
profitability. Amidst the freight war with road haulage companies, these pressures made it hard  to pass on rising 
costs to its customers through increased freight charges. The management had worked itself into a corner, but far 
from retreating these contradictions made it more determined to have it out with the railmen. 
     By October 1958, the Guarantee High Commission and Harbours Loan Bill31 was well on its way. Its objective 
was to enable East African governments to guarantee a loan of £8.5 million from the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development  [I.B.R.D.] for the provision of additional locomotives, rolling stock, new berths 
and harbours32. The Chief of the I.B.R.D. Transportation Division  duly flew into Nairobi ‘to start a tour of the East 
African railways and harbours system’33. E.A.R.H. had received a previous credit of £8.5. million from the I.B.R.D.  
in 195534. Such a short interval between two major loans suggested a sign of a deep and profound crisis on the 
way, in that the  company now needed  major injections of financial adrenalin  to stay afloat. 
     Apart from the World Bank, much of this credit had been raised on the London market. While most E.A.R.H.’s 
loans in the past had been repayable over long periods, there was an increasing resort to short term loans, as 
much as £8 million during 1958 alone35. Crisis tendencies were affirmed when, in the following year, E.A.R.H. paid 
out £2,880,000 in loan charges while just £1,970,000 were set aside for renewals36. Interest bearing capital had 
exacted its moloch like demands over a long period, and reduced the surpluses available for unpostponable 
investment. In essence, successive loans and indebtedness had served to displace  the company’s contradictions 
into the monetary sphere, though these now stood to stifle the accumulation process entirely. Finance capital had 
exerted an increasing  stranglehold over  the railway, tying the management's hands and greatly narrowing its 
room for manoeuvre in face of the rising temper of the railmen.    
 
The Freight War with the Road Hauliers 
     The manifest  inability of the deteriorating rail network and serviceable rolling stock to cope with increasing 
tonnage’s and tight delivery deadlines, conceded contracts on a large scale to increasing numbers of road haulage 
operators. Amongst the many small scale operators were former soldiers who had invested their wartime savings 
in vehicles. E.A.R.H.’s erstwhile unchallenged monopoly of transport came under serious threat from this quarter. 
With few branch lines to service them, both petty commodity producers, now producing on a large scale for 
overseas markets, and large scale plantation companies were looking to road transport to get their crops on the 
move. The plantation companies and the settlers, better served by the railway in past, also needed an extended 
network to meet the expanding scale of production. Whereas in the early days the roads were ‘mainly the ribs’ 
which carried goods  and people to the railway, ‘the spine of Kenya’s commerce’37, they  now threatened to 
function independently of, and as an alternative to, the railway. To win back its flagging business, E.A.R.H. faced 
reinvestment and capital renewal on a scale hitherto unexampled. 
     The company’s Renewals Fund was barely sufficient to renew its capital formation at a time when not just its 
replacement but also its augmentation i.e. the construction of new branch lines, was urgently required in face of 
the intense competition from road hauliers. This was so serious that by July 1958, the railway had a surplus 
capacity of 15 to 20% and ‘was anxious to get all the traffic it could’38. Its dilemmas were considerable. If it raised 
freight charges it risked losing further contracts to road operators, but if it relented it risked gathering sufficient 
capital reserves for reinvestment. Indeed, even with a competitive tariff, its estimated losses in 1958 due to 
competition were £800,00039. Both courses threatened to erode any absolute surplus. 
     It was in face of this competitive threat that the narrow minimalism of the management seemed most 
exposed. For even here they were at a loss to defend some of their more important freight charges in the 
escalating war with the road hauliers. After much prevarication, the general manager, J.R.Farquharson seemed to 
have found his resolve, “If we get no assistance from any east African government we shall fight this battle and 
stay alive - but on a competitive tariff ”40. The company then raised its charges for commodities that had been 
protected ‘by differential tariffs and carried at uneconomic rates’41. Nonetheless, there was a cruel penalty as the 
returns for February 1960 revealed upcountry railings down 10,000 tons on the previous February42.      
     The government writhed with the crisis and contradictions within its own infrastructure, the base upon which 
it was dependent. Hitherto the railway had enjoyed ‘a virtual monopoly of the transportation of imports and 
exports’ through its differential tariffs. This was reinforced by Kenya’s system of road transport licensing and 
E.A.R.H.’s effective resistance [until after 1960] to the building of a tarmac road linking Nairobi  to the coast.43 
E.A.R.H. was desperate to regain the advantage in its battle with the road hauliers and its deputy general 
manager, W.Urquhart, looked to the government to amend the Transport Licensing Ordinance in order to protect 
its differential tariff against road competition. He insisted that the differential tariff ‘must be protected ... as 
without this differential form of charging we cannot continue to assist Agriculture.’ He urged,   
 
‘the fullest utilisation of the railways capacity because the greater the quantity of traffic offering, the less the average cost of 
movement; therefore, the greater the volume of traffic handed to the Railway for carriage,  the less the unit cost becomes, 
and with this goes the possibility of reducing the average rate of 20 cents. Conversely, the greater the volume of traffic lost 
to road transport, the greater is the average unit cost of  movement and, with this, the necessity of increasing the average 
rate...’  “What is the Railway’s policy about rating?” The answer, in a nutshell, is that we want to carry the country’s products  
at the lowest rate  we possibly can. In order to enable us to do this we must obtain  as great a volume of traffic as possible, 
and so long as we have a differential  tariff with high rates susceptible to road competition we must have some sort of 
protection. I feel it is up to those bodies in East Africa which are interested in agriculture  to give us their support in this 
battle, which, I am afraid, is now developing  between the differential tariff and road transport interests.’ 44 
 
     In October 1958 there were clear signs that the government was preparing to push E.A.R.H. into abdicating its 
differential principle as  the Legislative Council gave its support to a £4 million programme to bitumise the main 
roads45 with plans to extend this after 1962 by a further £3 million46. Overall, approximately 300 miles of roads 
were to be built with loans at 6% interest47. Such a move would undoubtedly  strengthen the position of the road 
hauliers whilst absolving them from any substantial contributions to the heavy capital investment that would fall 
to the state. The Railways Chief Commercial Superintendent, C.T. Hutson, complained that ‘road transport might 
not be paying its fair share towards the cost of roads, which fell largely on the shoulder of private motorists’48.  
     Evidence that the government was looking both ways came with the recommendations of the interim 
committee appointed  to examine the Transport Licensing Ordinance, which proposed that E.A.R.H. ‘should be 
protected against road transport competition over long hauls parallel with the railways’49. The stresses of 
competition were finding expression within the departments of state itself, with some officials bending towards 
the road lobby50 and others maintaining entrenched loyalties to E.A.R.H.  The basis of railway rates  had been 
founded on the ‘differential principle’ whereby agricultural and primary products  were carried ‘at less than 
average cost’ and the budget balanced ‘by charging a relatively high rate  for those commodities which are judged 
capable  of bearing the additional charges.’  The railway tariff was divided into 8 class rates and 4 special rates. 
The top rate was set at 60 cents a mile for those goods in the higher brackets  such as textiles, cigarettes, wines 
and spirits, whilst the lowest rate of 6 cents a ton mile was applied to items  such as imported fertilisers and 
selected exports. Rates were also tapered  so that the rate per ton mile decreased as the distance increased. The 
average export rate was 12½  cents  a ton mile, while the  overall rate for imports and exports averaged 20 cents 
per ton mile51. 
     Addressing the Board of Agriculture, the company’s deputy general manager W.Urquhart defended its 
differential principle since, ‘in this way the Railway complies  with its obligations to assist agriculture and primary 
industries.’52 He urged that the costs of rail traffic be kept ‘static’  by ‘keeping up to date  with modern equipment 
and by increasing efficiency’ and exercising ‘the strictest economy’. He made clear that the company did not wish 
to raise its gross revenue by increasing ‘the average level of rates’, but planned to generate financial surpluses ‘by 
moving more and more traffic as the trade of this country grows.’53 
     Generally the lowest freight rates applied to basic agricultural products. All grain was charged at ‘Special Rate 
B’ at an average cost of 10 cents a ton mile. Processed produce for export such as canned fruit and vegetables 
were charged an average of 15 cents a ton mile.  Coffee, by far the colony’s most important earner of export 
revenue, was charged at 22 cents per ton mile. Unlike other commodities, the transit of coffee from its 
forwarding points to the coast was broken in Nairobi where all the colony’s coffee milling and marketing 
occurred.54 In the lowest rates, that of Special Classes A, B, C and D - which varied from 6 to 10 cents  a ton mile, 
such commodities as fertilisers, cattle cake, wattle bark, cotton seed, grains, sisal, sugar and timber were carried. 
The bias towards agriculture was also evident in the preferential treatment given to items such as fencing posts 
which was charged  at a lower rate  than, for example, timber for telegraph poles. Baling and fencing wire, mainly 
used in agriculture, were also charged at rates lower than  for similar products  used for other purposes. Cheap 
rates were also afforded for the carriage of livestock, with an average of around 9 cents per beast per mile, 
though a pig travelled more cheaply than the rest at 1½  cents a mile55. E.A.R.H. had planned to increase this rate 
by 50% but as the industry was going through a period of crisis this was deferred ‘until such time as the financial 
situation of the industry improves’. This was a further example of the way that the railway had carried settler 
agriculture, especially when its levels of profitability were at their lowest. However, E.A.R.H.’s own crisis of 
accumulation meant that it was now unable to shoulder such a burden. 
     To keep the rates charged to  agricultural products below the 20 cents average, E.A.R.H. relied upon carriage 
charges for consumer goods on such items as petrol, hardware and paints  at rates well above the average cost of 
movement so that it could ‘apply the revenue derived from these to subsidising the lower rated traffic’. It was 
essential that ‘a fairly high proportion’ of railway traffic should consist of such commodities, ‘for if the proportion 
of these traffics to the proportion of all traffics falls appreciably, then the Railway would be unable  to continue its 
policy of charging exceptionally low rates  for agricultural traffic.’ 56 
     E.A.R.H.’s relatively high freight charges to consumer goods made them vulnerable to competition from road 
hauliers, who ‘with a good load factor and a return load’ were able to carry freight at  around 30 cents per ton 
mile.  Any goods carried by the railway above this rate could be ‘weaned away’ by road transport. The annual 
losses to E.A.R.H. as a result of this competition  was estimated towards the end of 1958 to be ‘in the region of’ 
£840,000 a year of which  £385,000 was lost in Kenya.57 These figures excluded the movement of petrol between 
Mombasa and Nairobi which, had it been allowed to continue on the old tariff, would have resulted in a revenue 
loss on its own of £120,000 per annum.    
     In an attempt to recover some of this loss, ‘or at any rate to stabilise the position and stop further erosion...’, 
E.A.R.H. lowered its higher tariffs and raised its lower ones from January 1st, 1959. The highest rates were 
reduced from 60 to 40 cents a ton mile, at risk of a revenue loss to the railways of £700,000 a year. The projected 
increases in lower rates, to help make good the difference, marked the end of an era. All traffic moving in classes 
6 to 10 and all export rates were increased by 5 % on the assumption that road competition would be controlled,  
otherwise ‘it may be necessary to go still further in this narrowing of the differential.’ The top rate of forty cents 
was still vulnerable and ‘unless  this competition can be restrained’ the company anticipated that ‘sooner or 
later’58 it would have to relent and reduce this tariff to 35 cents or even 30 cents a ton mile. Correlatively, this 
would mean increasing the lower rates by a further 10%.  
 
A Regime of Economy   
     Whilst the management had been compelled to increase its freight charges on primary exports this still fell far 
short of enabling the company to take on the road operators. Expanding the network and building new branch 
lines in order to sideline the road hauliers brought the company face to face with resourcing considerable capital 
investment. Apart from loans, this could only be resourced at the expense of financing allocated for wages. Staff 
costs were the company’s most expensive budget item running at £8,990,000 of a total yearly expenditure of 
£19,500,000 for 195859.  Furthermore, the cost of the necessary technical changes required to prime the company 
spelt a rising organic composition of capital i.e. the relationship and ratio between constant capital [dead or 
abstract labour] and variable capital [living labour power]60. New investment in rolling stock and fixed capital 
generally courted the displacement of labour power, redundancies and restructuring for the railmen, as actually 
took place during 1959-65.  
     Another side to the company’s ‘operational economies’ was the rationalisation and more intense exploitation 
of labour power61.  Against a background of redundancies, was the increasing length and intensity of the working 
day for a contracting workforce which aimed to ensure the maximum physiological loading of each individual 
worker. The lower grade rail men endured the most intolerable conditions  and their  grievances on this score 
were submitted by one of their representatives to the general secretary of the Railway African Union [Kenya] in 
August, 1957,  
“...many, especially those in the Operating Department, have to work 84 hours a week of which 12 hours are ‘compulsory 
overtime’. Others in the same Department have to work 56 hours a week of which eight hours are compulsory overtime. In 
both these cases no time is permitted for meals in the course of duty. Imagine a points man running up and down the Yard 
marshalling trains for 12 hours without any meals and that for weeks on end, or a signal man working for eight hours without 
meals, or a Station Master attending to the public and passing trains from 8.00 hours to 20.00 hours without any meals. I 
challenge any one of you to try that and then perhaps you will be able to taste what the hell we are going through” 62.  
 
     It was not just the racist attitudes of European supervisors which sparked the inter-territorial rail strike in 
November 1959. This racism was embedded in an occupational structure which gave prominence to Europeans 
and Asians whilst holding Africans in a subordinate status. This aside, supervision was ‘the byword of the era’63 in 
E.A.R.H. and became a burning issue for employers all over Kenya engaged in the struggle to remake the 
workplace.64 The management attributed falling rates of profitability to the alleged slackness and low output of 
African workers which was blamed on their alleged inherent laziness. Just prior to the strike, the Chief Mechanical 
Engineer ‘felt that apart from Time and Motion Study, increased productivity could be achieved only by increased 
supervision, generally European supervision.’65 It should come as no surprise to us then that the Kenyan railmen 
should be provoked into struggle over this issue, for behind it lay concerted attempts to step up the rate of 
exploitation with the aim of arresting the railway’s flagging accumulation.   
     A regime of economy,  in the form of a massive rationalisation of production stared the management in the 
face. This meant taking on the railmen by cutting wages, raising productivity, lowering costs and shedding jobs.     
For a leaner EARH, a redesigned workplace, facilitated by large scale job losses66 and the installation of new and 
more advanced equipment, seemed to offer a way forward since the exploitation of the remaining workforce 
could be intensified through changes in working practices. This course involved considerable initial outlays, hence 
the management’s insistence ‘that there were no economic grounds whatever for the granting of an increase’67.   
According to the chairman of the East African High Commission ‘no case had been, or could be, established for 
any increase for any grade  of staff on economic grounds’68. However,  in the wake of the recommendations of 
the Carpenter Committee on African wages [1954]69, and in face of a determined strike, the management 
attempted to split the railmen by offering to increase minimum wages of the lowest grade Group C workers by 10 
shs. from 80/- to 90/- in separate deals within each colony on the basis of its ‘social aim to increase the income of 
the lowest paid staff...’70. However, such an offer was not be across the board, but at the expense of lesser 
increases for its higher grade workers.    
     E.A.R.H. belated course towards modernisation stood to downgrade all but its lowest grade workers and to  
attach the unskilled and semiskilled workers at the bottom of its Group C African staff still more firmly to the 
needs of the company.  A complicated gradings structure had evolved over many years on the railways with 
workers divided on racial lines and according to their level of skill. Even within the various skill categories there 
were complex gradations.  The overwhelming majority of African workers were contained within Group C which 
was structured into six categories. These were unskilled and semi-skilled workers such as labourers, porters, 
pointsmen, gangers, etc., on wages ranging from 70 shs. to 218 shs. a month. The Group B workers consisted of 
clerks, stationmasters, artisans and locomotive drivers on wages ranging from £118 to £1410 a year'71. This 
structure was used to mould deference to the company, to fragment the workforce and to disable the prospect of 
strike action. Following the Carpenter Report, the Lidbury Report of the Commission on the Civil Services of the 
East African Territories and the East African High Commission came up with the principle of non-racial salary 
scales to be applied amongst state employees. The old grading system, which specifically categorised workers by 
race,  was to be replaced by a complex structure  based on occupational categories. These overlapped to a very 
high degree  with the old  racial divisions and effectively reinstated them under a new guise.   
     The management drew back in horror at their own estimate of £6,000,000 to pay the railmen in the three 
territories. 'It is clear that there is no possibility of meeting these claims'72.  Having for years, ignored the creeping 
necessities of capital restoration, the employers had convinced themselves that the gap between the finance 
capital available and that required for large scale renewal was to be made up by the railmen themselves. This 
course collided with a determination from the railmen across the region to defend their differentials and to fight 
for a long overdue substantial across the board wage increases.  
 
Labour resistance in the transition to independence 
     The inter-territorial character of the railways administration was its greatest strength in dealing with the 
railmen. All trade unions  were required to comply with territorial ordinances  regarding registration in a way 
which virtually outlawed inter-territorial organisation amongst themselves. Various labour ordinances, within the 
three colonies of the region prohibited strike action those areas designated as essential services, pending the 
exhaustive procedures of 'compulsory arbitration'.  Thus railmen in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika though facing 
the same employer, could neither legally amalgamate, nor act in any singular way. Hence, the declaration of the 
‘National Congress of Railwaymen’ by all three unions at their Mwanza summit in Tanganyika in September, 1959, 
which established the principle of inter-territorialism amongst the men themselves, was of profound significance. 
As the meeting broke up, union leaders were undoubtedly afraid that they had gone beyond themselves.  
Nevertheless, the principles of inter-territorialism had been established.73 
     This significant move forward reflected strong undercurrents amongst East African railway men that erupted to 
the surface  in what became an inter territorial strike, which began on November 14th, 1959 in response to the 
bullying supervision of a European supervisor in Nairobi’s’ rail yards. The dispute spread rapidly compelling the 
the Railway African Union [Kenya] to put out a call for a colony wide strike. Within days, the majority of Kenya’s 
rail men had stopped work. Rail men in Tanganyika and Uganda soon followed them into action to mark the 
region’s first inter-territorial strike74 which continued intermittently until April 1960. The strike seems to have 
given coherence, form and universality to working class struggles at a crucial moment coincident with the end of 
Kenya’s Mau Mau Emergency and the announcement of transition to African majority government in January 
1960. This marked a significant watershed throughout the East African territories.  
     The rail strike triggered an avalanche of strikes throughout Kenya’s plantation economy and set in train 
recurrent strike waves in all three colonies. In Kenya, the transition to independence [1963] was bedevilled by 
successive waves in all sectors of the economy. Thus the railway struggles gave the trade unions the shove that 
they needed, as labour conflicts enveloped central Kenya and the Kericho valley throughout the immediate pre 
independence period with  tens of thousands out on prolonged strike. Almost a million working days were lost 
during 1961 alone75. The lifting of the Emergency, during which thousands of union members were arrested, 
incarcerated, or ‘disappeared’ was marked by a new confidence. The strike especially reawakened and lifted 
Kenya’s labour movement, aiding its recovery from years of harsh repression and semi-legality. According to 
Kenya’s Labour Department the ‘major feature’ of 1959 ‘was the spread of the trade union movement amongst 
African workers’.76  After years of fierce state repression and draconian workplace discipline, new layers of African 
workers embraced trade unionism and moved into their first organised struggles over wages and conditions. They 
were joined by unrestricted former Mau Mau detainees and the victims of land consolidation who entered the  
work force. The arousal of high expectation fuelled the successive and widespread strike waves that engulfed the 
Kenyan economy during the approach to independence which presented the outlines of a developing working 
class movement. The conflagrations came at a time when constitutional conferences least anticipated, or needed 
such external pressures.77  
     The period between 1959-65 was fraught with risks as the colonial governments transferred theirs authority. 
Throughout this process in Kenya, and exacerbating its tensions and contradictions, the state’s own servants, the 
‘non-productive’ workers, participated in successive strike waves whose embers glowed well beyond 
independence. These strike prone years were an unprecedented period, far surpassing all previous levels of 
militancy, which reached its zenith in the 1962 General Strike. Few urban and rural sectors were left untouched 
by industrial action: coffee, tea, sisal and general agriculture, the railways, docks, electricity supply, post and 
telecommunications, banks and airlines, construction, engineering, the oil and petroleum industry, chemicals, 
glass, distribution, tobacco, brewing and bottling, food processing, hotels and restaurants, timber and furniture 
trades, textiles, shoe and leather industries, education, civil and public services. These struggles were only 
eventually tamed as union leaders struggled to arrest the movement and surrender organisational autonomy to 
the post-colonial corporate state which proceeded to straitjacket the movement by a panoply of repressive 
labour laws, a process supervised by Kenya’s foremost labour leader, Tom Mboya. 
  
Conclusion 
     This article has examined and analysed the eruption of crisis tendencies within the infrastructure of the East 
African state monopoly of transport at the end of the colonial era.  Without EARH, little could move or circulate 
within the colonial economies of the region. It had served to facilitate the ‘first condition of capitalist production, 
namely, that the product must be a commodity  and therefore express itself as money and undergo the process of 
metamorphosis.’78 The company became crisis ridden as this facilitating role broke down. 
     The work here has drawn upon Marx’s theory of capitalist crisis in order to examine the rupture of opposites 
between use value and exchange value, purchase and sale, the commodity and money which then released 
powerful anti-commodity crisis tendencies. This theory was integral to Marx’s work on the commodity though it 
remains incomplete within his work and thus needs has to be interpreted in light of historical circumstances, as 
attempted here. The work contends that the anti-commodity can only take on meaning as an opposite which is 
essentially unified with its ‘other’, the commodity which fulfils itself only at the point of sale in the act of 
exchange.  Should this essential unity be unfulfilled, crisis tendencies are stirred into motion by ever present anti-
commodity tendencies inherent within the process of capital accumulation. This crisis within EARH threatened 
the rupture of purchase and sale in the wider regional economy79 by the breakdown in the system of commodity 
circulation that threatened the velocity of goods in motion and their becoming commoditised at the point of 
exchange. The contention here is that the anti-commodity is an innate tendency not an untoward occurrence 
disturbing an otherwise harmonious progress towards equilibrium. It has been treated here as a determining 
force that EARH could neither manage nor channel without an exceptional collision with its workforce.   
     In this regard, the work latterly brings labour power into view as the anti-commodity par excellence. This is a 
living substance whose bearers simultaneously embrace and defy commodification. The recurrent crises which 
beset capital dominate the wage bargaining process where the terms and conditions of commodification are 
periodically contested but can never be absolutely settled. The railmens strike against wage cuts and 
redundancies was brought on by the rationalisation required to facilitate commodification under a stringent set 
of conditions within global markets following the collapse of the post war primary commodities boom in the mid 
fifties. African railwaymen collided with the evolving political configuration of these external pressures which 
enveloped the decolonisation of the region. The inter-territorial strike was a major setback to the company’s 
rationalisation programme which could only be completed after independence under the auspices of  
‘Africanisation’. Whilst this ended racial pay scales and the colour bar generally, African railwaymen became 
strapped into the newly erected corporatist structures of bargaining and conflict resolution that precluded the 
right to strike.     
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